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vain, when I told him that in Myron Taylor Hall we had a book which
referred, not once, but 18 times, to the rule "de minimus."
A final protest to the publisher. I grow old, and my eyes are dim,
so that I cannot see. As I gaze upon the pages of this book I say:
"The words are Avins' words, but the print is the print of Oceana
Publications; I discern it not, because their hand is chary of large type."
Robert S. Pasley
Professor of Law
The Cornell Law School
Ithaca, New York
THE Biri OF RicGrs. By Learned Hand. Harv. Univ. Press, Cam-

bridge, Mass., Pp. 77, 1958. TE RiGHT OF THE PEOPLE. By William
0. Douglas. Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y., Pp. 216, 1958.
Here are two excellent little books that must be read, and must be
read together-their significance, in conventional legalese, is joint and
not several. Here from two eminent members of the Federal Bench,
are the briefs on either side of the argument over the ultimate meaning
of the Bill of Rights. The effect of reading them as companion volumes
is not to be convinced of the validity of one argument over the other,
but rather to be struck by the importance of the problem-to be
reminded again that the theoretical justification of the very foundation
of our constitutional system is still the subject of sharply drawn controversy.
Judge Hand addresses himself to the "well worn"' problem of the

proper scope of judicial review of legislation in matters relating to the
First, Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. Considering first the justification of the power of judicial review, Hand finds
nothing in the text of the Constitution itself from which that power
can be inferred. 2 From a short survey of the conditions that produced
the Constitution and a briefer analysis of the needs of the government
it created, Hand concludes that the power of judicial review was
reasonably implied by the necessities of our triangular-structured government. Somewhere, he argues, there must reside power to finally
arbitrate boundary disputes between the respective departments, and
it is this function which the Court seemed best suited to fulfill.3
Sharply distinguished from this function, however, is that of question1 Hand, The Bill of Rights, 1 (1958).
2
3

Id. at 10.
Id. at 29.
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ing the wisdom of choices made within departments, 4 and it is upon
the assumption that this distinction can be made that Hand rests his
argument for a limited judicial review confined strictly by the need
that produced it.'
With the foundation thus laid, Hand inquires into the proper
scope of judicial review in matters relating to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. He implies what he has said before,6 that the Amendments are hortatory or admonitory only, "not definite enough to be
guides on concrete occasions, prescribing no more than that temper
of detachment, impartiality, and an absence of self-directed bias that
is the whole content of justice." 7 He concludes that the proper scope
of review is "only to set the ambit of what is legislation and not to
redress any abuses in the exercise of power."8
Passing to the proper task of the Court when legislation infringes
upon rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, Hand first insists that
a legislature is as competent a protector of liberty as it is a guardian of
property,9 and that therefore, except in some extreme cases (not
elaborated) the scope of judicial review should be as limited in this
area as in the others.' 0 Almost grudgingly, Hand admits that freedom
of speech is freedom from majority (legislative) action and that therefore perhaps some "third chamber" is needed to give that freedom
meaning. But he concludes that even if this were true, the courts are
certainly not so constituted as to be effective in these complicated
adjustments of conflicting values."
Douglas' book is broader and deals only indirectly with the question to which Hand addressed himself. Douglas has undertaken an
essay on the whole range of civil rights. Freedom of Expression, the
first major subdivision, explores the category of infringement upon
speech through its various contexts in education, the arts, the press,
group action, etc. Limits upon this freedom are discussed under the
headings of Libel and Slander, Threats to Law and Order and Government Security, and Obscenity. Included is a short discussion of Censor4 Id. at 29, 30.
5 Ibid.
,Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, 278 (2d ed., 1953); Hand, "Chief Justice
Stone's Conception of the Judicial Process," 46 Col. L.R. 696 (1946).
7 Hand, op. cit. supra note 1 at 34.
8 Id. at 37.
9 Id. at 50.
10 Freund has likewise credited Hand with challenging the double standard
which puts Liberty in a "preferred position .over Property. See Freund, On
Understanding the Supreme Court, 12-14 (1949).
11 Hand, op. cit. supra note 1 at 69. For a general review of Hand's relation
to Freedom of Speech, see Lancaster, "Judge Hand's Views on the Free Speech
Problem," 10 Vand. L. R. 301 (1957).
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ship. The second major division of the essay concerns The Right To
Be Let Alone and tours through the maze of legislative investigations,
loyalty programs, academic freedom, self-incrimination, unlawful
search, etc. The final section on The Civilian Authority is a restatement of the traditional principles of military subordination.
Douglas treats these weighty matter throughout with admirable
candor and simplicity. With most topics there is a touch of history, a
brief glance at case development, and finally an evaluation of the
present situation brought to focus through discussion of recent Supreme Court decisions. The text, written for the layman, should serve
admirably as a primer on current constitutional litigation in this field.
But Douglas does not pretend to the office of the disinterested reporter. He is throughout an advocate, and his cause is that of a strong,
active and vigilant judiciary, whose members, armed with the clear
commands of the Bill of Rights, are urged with the rest of us to "become the champions of the virtues that have given the West great
civilizations"' 2 and to make "those virtues truly positive influences in
our policies." 13 Indeed, so much is Douglas the advocate, one has the
distinct impression that the book is really a collection and organization
of Douglas' dissenting opinions in the area of civil rights14-a brief
documented account of that philosophy of civil liberty which has been
the polestar of Douglas' dissenting conscience.
The book is important precisely for that reason. It gives us an
opportunity to compare two diametrically opposed conceptions of the
judicial function with respect to civil rights legislation-a comparison
at the basic level where the real disagreement lies.15 On the surface
we have two divergent views of the proper scope of judicial review.
Hand takes the position that the Court should not inquire into the
wisdom of legislative choice, and that even in civil rights matters the
Bill of Rights is no warrant for that sort of inquiry. Douglas on the
other hand considers it the duty of the Court to be ever vigilant in
protecting liberties from legislative encroachment and deems the First
Amendment (from which ".

.

. [a]11 notions of restraint ...

are ab-

sent" )16 to be a clear command to this effect. When one begins to dig
beneath the surface of these short volumes, he finds that each opinion
12

Douglas, The Right of the People, 11 (1958).

13

Id. at 12.

Indeed, some of the language from Douglas dissents appears verbatim in
this book. Compare, for example, the passage on p. 62 with the dissent in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 512 (1957).
15 As Cardozo long ago pointed out, it is through their philosophies ".
that judges are kept consistent with themselves, and inconsistent with one another."
Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, 12 (1921).
10 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 12 at 21.
14
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derives from a separate set of philosophical premises-one Positivism,
the other Idealism-which represent the horns of that philosophical
dilemma upon which American political and legal philosophy have

long been impaled.17
In the technical jargon of philosophy, Hand is a Positivist and by
this is meant simply that his philosophy comprehends a reality which
can be exhausted by empirical description.' In avoiding concern with
propositions that cannot be the subject of empirical proof, the Positivist rigidly separates the is from the ought,'9 conceiving statements
falling in the latter category merely as expressions of personal prefer-

ence,20 and as such, immediate, absolute, and underived. 21 In short,

the ultimate sanction for a value statement lies in the fact that it is
preferred; since a value choice is imperative in any statement of community policy 22 the Positivist considers a choice "just" or "right" only
when it is sanctioned by the cumulative preferences of the community
as tabulated by a device such as majority vote.23 Given this assump17 For a collection of essays dealing with this problem, see Burckhardt,
Cleavage in Our Culture (1952). For a treatment of this dilemma which specifically explores its relation to political theory, see Myers, Warfare of Democratic
Ideals (1956). For a glimpse of the still continuing debate in legal thinking, see
Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals", 71 Harv. L.R. 593
(Feb. 1958); Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart",
71 Harv. L.R. 630 (Feb. 1958).
18 Professor Hart suggests that there are five or more meanings given to
"Positivism" in contem o raralitr ature: (1) the contention that laws are commands of human beings (2) thee contention that there is no necessary connection
between law and morals or aw as it is and ought to be; (8) the contention that
the analysis (or study of meaning) of legal concepts is (a) worth purin and
into the causes or oris oflaw,
inquiries
9b)e distinguished
om to
sociological
inquiriesfrom
into historical
the relation
of law and other social phenomena, and
from the criticism and appraisal of law in terms of morals, social aims, or functions;
(4) the contention that a legal system is a "closed logical system" in which correct legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from predetermined legal
rules without reference to social aims, policies, moral standards; (5) the contention
that moral judgments cannot be estahlished or defended, as statements of fact
can, by rational argument, evidence, proof. Hart, op. cit. supra note 17, at page
601, n. 25.
19 For example, note Hand's insistence that one can discover what "is" legislation without considering its wisdom. Hand, op. cit. supra note 1, at 29.
11 20 While Professor Hart urges that the Positivist's separation of "is" and
"ought" does not necessarily depend on relegating "ought" statements to the world
of preference, (op. cit. supra note 17, at p. 626), Hand is clearly of this persuasion.
Hand, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24, 88.
21 Hand, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38. Cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and
Logic, 108, 109 (1948): ... sentences which simply express moral judgments do
not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come
under the category of truth and falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same
reason as a cry of pain or a word of command is unverifiable-because they do
not express genuine propositions."
22
2 Hand, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87.
3 Truth, ultimately, to the positivist, is a matter of power, numerical or physical. Cf. Holmes: "I used to say when I was young, that truth was the majority
vote of that nation that could lick all others . . . and I think that the statement
was correct... ." Holmes, "Natural Law", 82 Harv. L.R. 40 (1918).
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tion, the legislature, being the authoritative spokesman of community
preference, is likewise by definition the only legitimate judge of community policy.24 For the court to question the wisdom of legislation
is for the court to undertake the making of choices itself.25 Because
this implies a standard of value apart from the cumulative expression
of preference available as a guide to the legislature 20 and because in
the empirically defined reality of the Positivist these outside standards
do not exist 27 there is no legitimate warrant for an active judiciary.
The Bill of Bights, having no foundation in Divine or Natural Law,
becomes merely hortatory or admonitory.
In sharp contrast to the Positivism of Hand, is what may be called
the Idealism of Douglas. In the reality of the Idealist, certain standards of value do exist apart from majority preferences. Sovereignty
does not lie with the majority, says Douglas, but with all indivisibly s
and it is "dangerous" therefor to consider the legislature supreme.2
There are certain "natural rights" which "have a broad base in morality
and religion" and which may be "implied from the very nature of man
as a child of God."30 These rights are considered a de facto limit on
governmental, legislative or majority action. "Our system", said Douglas in an earlier work, "presupposes that there is . . . the higher
authority to which all laws are appealable .... Our civilization rests
on the premise that there is a Supreme Being to whom not only man,
32
but government, is accountable." 3' Citing an earlier work of Hand,
Douglas concludes:
I disagree with the view of Judge Learned Hand that the prohibitions
of the First Amendment, in terms absolute, are 'no more than admonitions of moderation'.... The idea that they are no more than that
has done more to undermine liberty in this country than any other
single force. That notion is, indeed, at the root of the forces of disintegration
that have been eroding the democratic ideal in this coun33
try.

We have thus two eminently respectable views of the meaning of
the Bill of ights-two widely held theories about the relation of democratic government to its citizens. The views are flatly incompatible.
24 Hand, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38, 39.
25
Id. at 39.
26

Id.at 73.

27
28

Id. at 2, 34.
Douglas, op. cit. supra note 12, at 23.

29 Id. at 44.
30 Id. at 89.
31

Douglas, Almanac of Liberty, 184 (1954).
32 Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, 278 (2d ed., 1953).
33 Douglas, op. cit. supra note 12, at 33.
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Morris Cohen has noted our almost schizophrenic attempt to accommodate both views.
The reason why all these arguments must logically break down
is that they ultimately involve two contradictory absolutistic conceptions of what is law. One is that the law is the will of the
sovereign, and the other that law is eternal reason or immutable
justice. The notion that whatever pleases the sovereign is law comes
to us from the Byzantine period of Roman law. The eighteenth
century writers simply put the people in the place of the absolute
emperor. The notion of law as reason comes to us from the Stoic
philosophy. Ever since Blackstone acquired his dominance over American legal thought, his method of simply putting these two incompatible notions side by side, in the same definition, has prevailed. Now
it is possible to construct a doctrine of restraints on the popular will
in the interest of justice or reason; and it is also possible to construct a
doctrine that what the people want, whether it be just or not, should
prevail as law. But the combination of the two in the theory that law
which judges make 34
is both just and the will of the people, is a logically impossible feat.
As a matter of readily demonstrable fact, one can expect Judge
Hand and Justice Douglas to decide cases differently in this area; thus
these two books provide a vivid illustration of the intimate relation
between philosophy and actual concrete judicial decision. 3 5 Further,
this reader is left with the feeling that neither of these theories fully

explains the reality in which we work. The problem of value determination is one of the most vital we face and the contributions of
Idealism and Positivism to the resolution of the problem are equally

inadequate. From Plato's Guardians through the Inquisition to modem
Fascism and Communism, history has demonstrated the danger of
treating values as inherent in a higher reality36-if

ideals exist which

are incapable of public demonstration, spokesmen and interpreters,
34 M. Cohen, Law and the Social Order, 187 (1938). See Myers, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 8-17.
35
relationship which our quest for certainty makes us reluctant to admit.
Thus Patterson, Jurisprudence-Men and Ideas of the Law, 829 (1958): "To
establish that any distinct philosophy of law had a decisive influence upon a particular judicial decision or the enunciation of any particular legal doctrine is rarely
possible, for the generalizations of legal philosophy are usually too comprehensive
and abstract to be decisive of legal issues in litigation." Re Hand and Douglas,
quaere?
30 Although the Natural Law theorist, failing to see that "misinterpretation"
is the ultimate fate of non-demonstrable Idealism, explains past mistakes on the
basis of questionable expertise. "The... most serious difficulty about natural law
must be recognized in the fact that natural law has been invoked, though falsely,
by certain questionable experts on the natural law in order to justify, and even
glory in, their anti-intellectual, anti-progressive, and anti-humanitarian bias. This
irresponsible and immoral policy, parading under the name of natural law, has
done almost irreparable damage to the cause of natural law. It has, in many instances, alienated from the natural law many people who, under more favorable
circumstances, would have become its most persuasive adherents and spokesmen."
Chroust, "Natural Law and Legal Positivism," 18 Ohio St. L.J. 178, 184 (1952).
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intimate with this reality, must ultimately be followed without ques7

tion.3

On the other hand, Positivists would have us believe that real
problems (such as the problem of value determination) are solved by
wish or preference, or by the application of standards based on wish
or preference. We all seem agreed that, at least in physical affairs,
problems are empirical realities, demanding for their effective solution the insistent rigorous application of every available quantum of
human intelligence to the task of creating tentative statements about
a problem's causes and about the ends sought in its resolution. We
have been delinquent in not carrying over this attitude to the central
problem in the social sciences-the problem of value. The candid
actualities of the problem-solving process have never been popular
grist for the philosopher's mill. A philosophy so oriented is without a
traditional metaphysical base, and thus almost by definition, not
respectable as a philosophy. Thus while our behavior is and must be
problem-oriented, our attempts at a consistent formulation of the basis
of action result in profound theories whose only short-coming is that
they fail to describe what is really taking place.
Because they forcibly demonstrate the existence of this problem
these books are highly recommended.
William R. Andersen
Assistant Professor of Law
University of Kentucky

TE PowEi ELr=. By C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford. 1956.*
Professor Anderson is to be commended for his detailed analysis
of C. Wright Mill's THE POWER ELITE.* However, I believe Professor Anderson's critique failed to emphasize the enormity of Mills'
undertaking, which, if fully appreciated, would lead to a higher regard,
if not geniune enthusiasm, for this provocative book.
My enthusiasm for this volume stems only in part from agreement
with certain of the conclusions. As a matter of fact, one could take
37 "Such concepts as 'freedom of conscience,' 'free speech,' 'inalienable
rights,' for example, established themselves as 'eternal truths,' after the manner of
the platonic tradition, which meant that they did not have to justify themselves in
terms of circumstance and function ....
[As such] there is no escape from the
necessity of relying on experts who can speak with authority on matters pertaining
to eternal truth." Bode, 'Cleavage in our Culture", in Burckhardt, op. cit. supra
note 17 at 8, 9.
* For the thorough discussion of Mills, The Power Elite, by C. Arnold Anderson and Harry L. Gracey. See 46 Ky. L.J. (Winter) 801 (1958).-Ed.

